China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present (The Harvard Cold War Studies)

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Some readers, of course, may hope to see more studies of the relationship in more recent decades because this is also indicated in the subtitle.

  1. Great Communication Secrets of Great Leaders?
  2. China Learns from the Soviet Union, –Present - .
  3. Xiaojia Hou | Department of History | San Jose State University?
  4. Testing Times: The Uses and Abuses of Assessment;

All the same, the book is a valuable addition to current scholarship on the subject. Copyright c by Clio-online, 'connections' , H-Soz-Kult, and the author, all rights reserved. DE EN. Bernstein u. Bernstein, Thomas P. Lanham Lexington Books. ISBN , in: Connections. A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists, Copyright c by Clio-online, 'Connections', and the author, all rights reserved.

This work may be copied and redistributed for non-commercial, educational purposes, if permission is granted by the author and usage right holders. Editors Information.

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Requires Adobe Digital Editions. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet split voided the Western political perception that "monolithic communism", the Eastern Bloc, was a unitary actor in geopolitics, especially during the — period in the Vietnam War , which led to U. In the post-war — period, the United States had fully financed the KMT, Chiang, his nationalist political party, and the National Revolutionary Army , his armed forces in the civil war; and, despite having lost the war to the communists, the U.

Chiang Kai-shek later established the Republic of China , in As a revolutionary theoretician of Communism seeking to realise a socialist state in China, Mao developed and adapted the urban ideology of Orthodox Marxism for practical application to the agrarian conditions of pre-industrial China and the Chinese people.

In , whilst fighting the Chinese Communist Revolution against the KMT nationalists, Mao despatched the American journalist Anna Louise Strong to the West, bearing political documents explaining China's socialist future, and asked that she "show them to Party leaders in the United States and Europe", for their better understanding of the Chinese Communist Revolution, but that it was not "necessary to take them to Moscow".

Rezension zu: T. P. Bernstein u.a. (Hrsg.): China Learns from the Soviet Union | Connections

For the PRC, the treaty was a geopolitical relationship in three parts: i political, ii military, and iii economic. In six years' time, the great differences between the Russian and Chinese interpretations and applications of Marxism—Leninism voided the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. In , guided by Soviet economists, the PRC applied the USSR's model of planned economy , which featured centralised control, and gave first priority to the development of heavy industry , and second priority to the production of consumer goods. Later, ignoring the guidance of technical advisors, Mao developed the Great Leap Forward — to transform agrarian China into the industrialised People's Republic of China, with disastrous results for people and land.

Mao's unrealistic goals for agricultural production went unfulfilled because of poor planning and realisation, which aggravated rural starvation and increased the number of deaths caused by the Great Chinese Famine — , which resulted from three years of drought and poor weather. Despite such economic relations between socialist nations, Mao of the PRC and Khrushchev of the Soviet Union disliked each other, personally and ideologically.

In light of de-Stalinization, the CPSU's changed ideological orientation — from Stalin's confrontation of the West to Khrushchev's coexistence with the West — posed problems of ideological credibility and political authority for Mao, who had emulated Stalin's style of leadership and practical application of Marxism—Leninism in the development of Socialism with Chinese characteristics and the PRC as a country.

The Hungarian Revolution of against the rule of Moscow was a serious political concern for Mao, because it had required military intervention to suppress, and its occurrence denied the political legitimacy of the communist party to be in government. In response to that discontent among the European members of the Eastern Bloc, the CPC denounced the USSR's de-Stalinization as Marxist revisionism , and reaffirmed the Stalinist ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct course for achieving socialism in China.

In the event, such Sino-Soviet divergences of Marxist—Leninist praxis and interpretation began fracturing "monolithic communism" — the Western misperception of absolute ideological unity in the Eastern Bloc. From Mao's perspective, the success of the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with the West would geopolitically isolate the PRC; [22] whilst the Hungarian Revolution indicated the possibility of anti-communist revolt in the PRC, and in China's sphere of influence.

To thwart such discontent, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign of political liberalization — the freedom of speech to publicly criticize government, the bureaucracy, and the CPC; but the campaign proved too-successful when it featured blunt criticism of Mao, as the Chinese head-of-state and as the chairman of the Communist Party of China.

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In July , at Beijing, Khrushchev and Mao were negotiating joint Sino-Soviet naval bases in China, from which nuclear-armed Soviet submarines would deter US intervention to that region of eastern Asia. Formal, ideological response to such a geopolitical contingency compelled Khrushchev's revision of the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence to include regional wars, like Mao's second war-crisis in the strait of Taiwan.

In the context of the tri-polar Cold War, Khrushchev doubted the mental sanity of Mao, because his unrealistic policies of geopolitical confrontation might provoke nuclear war between the capitalist and the communist ideological blocs; so, to thwart Mao's warmongering, Khrushchev cancelled foreign-aid agreements and the delivery of Soviet atomic bombs to the PRC.


Throughout the s, Khrushchev maintained positive Sino-Soviet relations with foreign aid especially Soviet technology for Project , the Chinese atomic bomb but the political tensions perdured, because the economic benefits of the USSR's peaceful-coexistence policy voided the belligerent PRC's geopolitical credibility among the nations under Chinese hegemony , especially after a failed PRC—US rapprochement. In the Chinese sphere of influence, that Sino-American diplomatic failure and the presence of US atomic bombs in Taiwan justified Mao's confrontational foreign policies — such as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 23 August — 22 September with Taiwan, a second Republic of China , headed by Chiang Kai-shek, whom the US sponsored and officially claimed and recognised as the leader of the two Chinas.

In late , the CPC revived Mao's guerrilla-period cult of personality to portray Chairman Mao as the charismatic, omniscient leader solely qualified to control the policy, the administration, and the popular mobilisation required to realise the Great Leap Forward — to industrialise China. Those circumstances allowed ideological Sino-Soviet competition, and Mao publicly criticised Khrushchev's economic and foreign policies as deviations from Marxism—Leninism in the Soviet Union. To Mao Zedong, the events of the — period indicated that Khrushchev of the Soviet Union was politically untrustworthy as an orthodox Marxist.

The Communist Party of China believed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concentrated too much on "Soviet—US co-operation for the domination of the world", with geopolitical actions that contradicted Marxism—Leninism. In the s, the looming Sino-Soviet split was manifested in public denunciation and criticism of the allied countries of China and Russia.

Editors’ Introduction

The PRC denounced the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — as not socialist for having a mixed economy , and attacked Marshal Tito Josip Broz as an ideological deviationist for pursuing a politically non-aligned foreign policy that was separate and apart from the geopolitics of the USSR and the PRC, whilst remaining in the Eastern bloc. In China, Mao and the CPC interpreted Eisenhower's refusal to apologise to the USSR as disrespectful of the national sovereignty of socialist countries, and held political rallies aggressively demanding Khrushchev's military confrontation with the American aggressors; without such decisive action, the Communist leader Khrushchev lost face with the PRC.

In the s, the split featured public displays of acrimonious intramural quarrels between Stalinist Chinese and anti-Stalinist Russian communists. In turn, Peng insulted Khrushchev as a Marxist revisionist whose political regime as premier of the USSR showed him to be a "patriarchal, arbitrary, and tyrannical" ruler. In June , at the zenith of de-Stalinization, the USSR denounced Albania as a politically backward country for retaining Stalinism as government and model of socialism.

In response to the insults, Khrushchev withdrew 1, Soviet technicians from the PRC, which cancelled some joint-scientific-projects meant to foster Sino-Soviet amity and co-operation between socialist nations. In response, Mao justified his belief that Khrushchev had, somehow, caused China's great economic failures, and the famines occurred in the period of the Great Leap Forward; nonetheless, the PRC and the USSR remained pragmatic allies, which allowed Mao to alleviate famine in China and to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes.

To Mao, Khrushchev had lost a measure of political authority and ideological credibility, because his U. That miscalculation of person and circumstance voided diplomacy between the U. In that vein, the USSR publicly approved of India's annexation of Goa 18—19 December from Portugal, which the PRC minimised by saying that: "India's apparent contribution to anti-imperialist struggle consists of taking on the world's smallest imperialist power. Regarding that Soviet loss-of-face, Mao said that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism" with a negotiated, bilateral, military stand-down.

To which Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign policies would lead to an East—West nuclear war. In that time, the PRC's nuclear weapons program was nascent Project , and Mao perceived the test-ban treaty as the nuclear powers' attempt to thwart the PRC's becoming a nuclear superpower.